Bibliographies du service Veille et Analyses, IFÉ

WIKINDX Resources

Berliner David C. & Amrein Audrey L. (2002). « High-Stakes Testing, Uncertainty, and Student Learning ». Education Policy Analysis Archives, vol. 10, n° 18, mars. En ligne : <>. 
Added by: orey (01 Jan 1970 01:00:00 Europe/Paris)
Resource type: Journal Article
BibTeX citation key: Berliner2002
Categories: General
Keywords: compétence, curriculum, États-Unis, évaluation, politique éducative
Creators: Amrein, Berliner
Collection: Education Policy Analysis Archives
Views: 3948/8135
Views index: 0%
Popularity index: 0%
A brief history of high-stakes testing is followed by an analysis of eighteen states with severe consequences attached to their testing programs.
These 18 states were examined to see if their high-stakes testing programs were affecting student learning, the intended outcome of high-stakes testing policies promoted throughout the nation.

Scores on the individual tests that states use were not analyzed for evidence of learning. Such scores are easily manipulated through test-preparation programs, narrow curricula focus, exclusion of certain students, and so forth.
Student learning was measured by means of additional tests covering some of the same domain as each state's own high-stakes test. The question asked was whether transfer to these domains occurs as a function of a state's high-stakes testing program.

Four separate standardized and commonly used tests that overlap the same domain as state tests were examined: the ACT, SAT, NAEP and AP tests. Archival time series were used to examine the effects of each state's high-stakes testing program on each of these different measures of transfer. If scores on the transfer measures went up as a function of a state's imposition of a high-stakes test we considered that evidence of student learning in the domain and support for the belief that the state's high-stakes testing policy was promoting transfer, as intended.

The uncertainty principle is used to interpret these data. That principle states "The more important that any quantitative social indicator becomes in social decision-making, the more likely it will be to distort and corrupt the social process it is intended to monitor."

Analyses of these data reveal that if the intended goal of high-stakes testing policy is to increase student learning, then that policy is not working.

While a state's high-stakes test may show increased scores, there is little support in these data that such increases are anything but the result of test preparation and/or the exclusion of students from the testing process. These distortions, we argue, are predicted by the uncertainty principle. The success of a high-stakes testing policy is whether it affects student learning, not whether it can increase student scores on a particular test. If student learning is not affected, the validity of a state's test is in question.

Evidence from this study of 18 states with high-stakes tests is that in all but one analysis, student learning is indeterminate, remains at the same level it was before the policy was implemented, or actually goes down when high-stakes testing policies are instituted. Because clear evidence for increased student learning is not found, and because there are numerous reports of unintended consequences associated with high-stakes testing policies (increased drop-out rates, teachers' and schools' cheating on exams, teachers' defection from the profession, all predicted by the uncertainly principle), it is concluded that there is need for debate and transformation of current high-stakes testing policies.
Added by: orey  
wikindx 4.1.9 ©2013 | Total resources: 8749 | Database queries: 57 | Script execution: 0.31788 secs | Style: VST pour affichage | Bibliography: WIKINDX Master Bibliography
Nous écrire
accueil Veille et Analyses    |     nouveautés    |     dossiers d'actualité        

École normale supérieure de Lyon
Institut français de l'Éducation
Veille et Analyses
15 parvis René-Descartes BP 7000 . 69342 Lyon cedex 07
Standard : +33 (0)4 72 76 61 00
Télécopie : +33 (0)4 72 76 61 93